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By HERBERT HovENKAMp*
AS THE TOPIC selection for this symposium indicates, maintaining
competition in pharmaceutical markets is a top priority in United
States antitrust policy today. Further, it is no easy task. While the phar-
maceutical industry contains numerous firms, it also has several other
characteristics that have historically made collusion and high prices
easy to achieve. One is relatively low elasticity of demand. Consumers
often need drugs badly and are willing to pay a great deal to have
them. Further, employee-paid health insurance and other third party
payors tend to insulate consumers from drug costs, both by making
prices less transparent and shielding the consumers themselves from
the full impact. In addition, the pharmaceutical industry is character-
ized by a high degree of product differentiation. While there are hun-
dreds of drugs out there, typically only a small number are suitable for
a particular diagnosis, and in many cases there are only one or two
that a physician believes to be suitable for a patient. This fact makes
collusion within relatively small groupings possible, and cartels with
small numbers of members are always more threatening than cartels
with greater numbers.1 Most pharmaceuticals are also characterized
by high fixed costs and a great deal of innovation risk, which tends to
make entry barriers into the pharmaceutical industry rather high.
At the same time, however, the pharmaceutical industry is a very
difficult one for antitrust policy to deal with. First of all, it is techno-
logically complex, and generalist Article III federal judges and partic-
ularly juries are not good at dealing with technological complexity.
Antitrust's tools of measurement are crude, particularly for such
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things as determining a firm's market power. 2 Its ability to recognize
and adequately deal with anticompetitive conduct that implicates in-
tellectual property rights is at best severely limited. Further, pharma-
ceutical markets are characterized by a high degree of innovation, a
place where antitrust must always step lightly Antitrust remedies that
unnecessarily deprive defendants of patent rights or that reduce the
value of prospective patenting are likely to do more harm than good
to the long run performance of the industry.
Nevertheless, with careful thought we can make antitrust perform
well. Here, I suggest a few basic principles for antitrust analysis in the
pharmaceutical industry:
First, antitrust decision-makers should be careful but not timid.
Second, antitrust must always be sensitive to the regulatory environ-
ment in which a challenged restraint occurs.
Third, the so-called "per se rule" and the "rule of reason" are highly
artificial constructs whose gross definitions often serve to obscure
rather than illuminate antitrust analysis.
I. Caution, but Not Paralysis
The history of the antitrust laws is cluttered with examples of ex-
cessive enthusiasm, imagined injuries to competition, and overly ag-
gressive remedies.4 Far too often we have condemned practices that
were procompetitive or applied remedies that were even more harm-
ful to the economy than the conduct they were intended to correct.
Conduct that is merely tortious, or that harms a rival, is not actionable
under the antitrust laws unless it also harms competition,5 and harm
to competition is fairly exceptional. At the same time, however, anti-
trust should not be reluctant to become involved in a market when a
genuine threat to competition appears. This is true even when the
conduct at issue implicates patent or other intellectual property laws.
With few notable exceptions, such as the Robinson-Patman Act,6
the antitrust laws are public regarding legislation that is not under the
control of any special interest group. 7 The antitrust laws are spare in
2. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP &JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW,
ch. 5 (2d ed. 2002).
3. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTI-
TRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
(2002 & Supp. 2005).
4. For a good presentation of such excesses, see ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
5. See generally Sherman Act of 1890 §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
6. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).
7. See generally 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, ch. 23 (1999).
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their wording and exhort courts to condemn practices only when they
restrain trade, monopolize markets, or lessen competition.8 To be
sure, the courts have not consistently interpreted this exhortation and
have often favored particular interest groups at the expense of the
economy as a whole. For example, in the 1960s the courts were exces-
sively concerned with the welfare of small business.9 However, no spe-
cial interest group has managed to control Congress's overall antitrust
agenda.
Traditionally, the intellectual property laws were also public re-
garding legislation. Increasingly, however, IP law-making has been
captured by special interests. This is particularly true of the Copyright
Act 10 since 1976, but it is also true of many "specialty" amendments to
the patent statute.11 While the basic patent provisions remain general
and give the federal courts considerable discretion to fashion patent
policy in the public interest, the more recent detailed amendments
are not necessarily of that nature. In general, detailed statutory provi-
sions are a sign that Congress has made special deals with various in-
terest groups in fashioning legislation. 12
In such a setting the courts need not be too hesitant to step in.
Indeed, a good way to combat special interest capture is to interpret
"public regarding" provisions broadly and special interest provisions
narrowly. When statutory provisions suggesting "capture" are inter-
preted narrowly, with ambiguities resolved against the special interest
responsible for them, it forces Congress to be more transparent about
what it wants, thus exposing them to the political costs of what they
are doing. Alternatively, it places the burden of getting the statute
amended on the special interest group that obtained the statute in the
first place, and their previous success indicates that they are in the
best position to do so. Interpreting such a provision to favor the spe-
8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (restraint of trade); id. § 2 (monopolies); Clayton Act, ch.
323, §§ 3, 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (2000)
(tying, exclusive dealing, and mergers that substantially lessen competition).
9. See Bom, supra note 4, at 202-06.
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
11. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-
2000, 88 CAL. L. Rv. 2187, 2190 (2000);JEssicA LrrIAN, DIGITAL COPYMGHT 26-29 (2001);
John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987,
1007-08 (2003); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv.
1575, 1637 (2003); William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective,
14 CARuozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996).
12. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 4, 16-18 (1984); Merges, supra note 11, at 2190.
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cial interest places that burden with those interests, including perhaps
the public interest, that lost the legislative battle to begin with. 13
The lesson for antitrust is that, when a real anticompetitive threat
appears on the horizon, antitrust should not be too timid to intervene
and should not be detained by highly generalized concerns for intel-
lectual property rights that Congress has not articulated with clarity.
This gives antitrust a significant role in limiting IP licenses, settlement
agreements, and other practices that limit competition.
II. Sensitivity to the Regulatory Environment
In our system antitrust is only the "residual" regulator of markets.
It is not the only regulator in any market, and in some it is a relatively
minor regulator or has been completely ousted by the regulatory
regime.
To give a couple of examples, virtually every market in the United
States is subject to the regulation imposed by the labor laws or the civil
rights laws. The civil rights laws rarely create conflicts with antitrust
policy, but the labor laws do.14 Other forms of regulation impact
price, output, or the possibilities for collusion or exclusionary prac-
tices much more directly, and, in these, antitrust always exists in some
tension with the regulatory regime.15 The more the regulatory regime
in question takes competition into account in making its decisions or
the greater the degree to which practices challenged under the anti-
trust laws have been explicitly mandated or approved by a regulatory
enterprise, the less room there is for antitrust in that particular mar-
ket. When the regulatory agency fully considers competitive concerns
in making a decision, or when Congress or sometimes an agency com-
pels or explicitly approves conduct that is later challenged under the
antitrust laws, then we may conclude that antitrust is "ousted" from
that market to that extent. Alternatively, we may say that the defen-
dant enjoys a regulatory immunity from antitrust challenge to that
particular conduct.' 6 A corollary of these propositions is that as a mar-
13. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
Rv. 2162, 2169-70 (2002).
14. See, e.g., Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (exempting from antitrust
challenge NFL rule limiting eligibility of draftees who were not at least three full seasons
beyond high school); see also IA PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
7 255-257 (2d ed. 2002).
15. See IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 1 240-243; Herbert Hovenkamp,
2003 Milton Handler Antitrust Review: Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. Bus.
L. REv. 335.
16. IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 240(c)-(d), 242(a).
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ket goes through "deregulation," or loosening up of regulatory stan-
dards, the role for antitrust can be expected to increase. 17
While the production and distribution of pharmaceuticals is
heavily regulated, mainly by the Food and Drug Administration, very
little of this regulation directly implicates the antitrust law's concern
for maintaining competition. As a result, there are relatively few deci-
sions arising in the pharmaceutical industry that have found an anti-
trust immunity.
The intellectual property laws are also a regulatory regime, how-
ever, and one that is more expressly concerned with the maintenance
of competitive markets. To be sure, the IP laws are concerned with a
different aspect of maintaining competition than antitrust is. The IP
laws are not particularly concerned about price or output in the short
run, but they are heavily concerned with encouraging the optimal
amount of innovation.
Determining the proper relationship between the antitrust laws
and any particular regulatory regime has always been a difficult task
that has required a great deal of appellate court oversight and re-
sulted in many divided Supreme Court decisions.18 At one time the
Supreme Court was inclined to say that if regulation in a market was
"pervasive," then the antitrust laws were completely ousted from that
market. Thus most of the conduct in that market enjoyed a kind of
blanket antitrust immunity.' 9
But this type of global immunity is out of fashion now. Today,
immunity decisions are much more conduct specific. In general, the
greater the degree to which an agency actively supervised conduct,
taking competitive concerns into account, the more likely the conduct
is to be found immune. What we really want to know is whether a
challenged act was a product of effectively unsupervised private firm
17. See id. 241.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Gordon
v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341
(1963).
19. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, 409 U.S. 363, 385 (1973) (pervasive regulation
leads to antitrust immunity); Pan Am World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 300-01
(1963) (similar); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) (congres-
sional rejection of comprehensive regulatory scheme for electric industry supports rejec-
tion of antitrust exemption claim); United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 352
(1963) (regulation not pervasive; agency approval does not immunize merger); United
States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 348-51 (1959) (similar); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S.
188, 197-98 (1939) (similar).
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discretion, or whether the conduct, including anticompetitive threats,
was thoroughly reviewed by the regulator.2
Just last term the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtin Trinko, LLP.21 That case
raised issues about the relationship between the antitrust laws and the
1996 Telecommunications Act,22 which requires incumbent tele-
phone carriers, or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs"), to
interconnect with competitive carriers so that the latter can offer local
telephone service in competition with the incumbent carriers. 23 The
antitrust claim was one of unlawful unilateral refusal to deal, or a vio-
lation of antitrust's "essential facilities" doctrine, which requires a
dominant firm to share certain inputs with smaller rivals. Refusal to
deal doctrine involving single firms has been one of the most contro-
versial and difficult-to-administer areas of antitrust. An overly broad
right of rivals to share a dominant firm's facilities discourages rivals
from building their own facilities, thus undermining the very competi-
tion that antitrust seeks to foster.2 4 Indeed, a broad sharing obligation
actually facilitates collusion by involving the dominant firm and its ri-
vals in ongoing communications and shared use of common facili-
ties. 25 Further, fashioning and enforcing orders against defendants
faces severe obstacles. First, a court rather than the market must deter-
mine what must be shared. In addition, the price of sharing must be
determined. Finally, the court has to monitor compliance. In sum, the
essential facility doctrine threatens to turn antitrust courts into regula-
tory agencies, something for which courts of general jurisdiction are
extremely poorly suited, particularly when they are required to pro-
ceed by means of jury trials in damages actions.
So, on the one side antitrust was a very crude and imprecise vehi-
cle for enforcing interconnection agreements in the telecommunica-
tions industry. On the other side, the interconnection process was
20. See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1984); Gordon v. NewYork Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY- THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 18.1, 19.1-19.3 (forth-
coming 3d ed. 2005).
21. 124 S. Ct. 872 (2004).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2000); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371
(1999).
24. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 771.
25. Id. & 772(c) (4).Justice Scalia's Trinko opinion for the Court also made this obser-
vation. See Trinko, 124 S. Ct. at 879.
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subject to intensive regulatory scrutiny by both the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC") on the federal level and state regulatory
agencies. This made antitrust an inferior decision-maker. As the Court
observed in Trinko,
Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure
and circumstances of the industry at issue. Part of that attention to
economic context is an awareness of the significance of regulation.
As we have noted, "careful account must be taken of the pervasive
federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry."
"[A] ntitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and reflect the dis-
tinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to
which it applies." 26
In that particular case, an important element of this regulatory
setting was
the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and rem-
edy anticompetitive harm. Where such a structure exists, the addi-
tional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement
will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust
laws contemplate such additional scrutiny. Where, by contrast,
"[t]here is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which per-
forms the antitrust function," the benefits of antitrust are worth its
sometimes considerable disadvantages. Just as regulatory context
may in other cases serve as a basis for implied immunity, it may also
be a consideration in deciding whether to recognize an expansion
of the contours of § 2.27
Looking at the general structure and operation of the regulatory
regime, the Court found that it
demonstrates how, in certain circumstances, "regulation signifi-
cantly diminishes the likelihood of major antitrust harm." Con-
sider, for example, the statutory restrictions upon Verizon's entry
into the potentially lucrative market for long-distance service. To
be allowed to enter the long-distance market in the first place, an
incumbent LEC must be on good behavior in its local market. Au-
thorization by the FCC requires state-by-state satisfaction of [the
Telecommunications Act] § 271's competitive checklist, which as
we have noted includes the nondiscriminatory provision of access
to UNEs. 28
26. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. at 881 (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422
U.S. 86, 91 (1975); Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer,
C.J.)) (citations omitted).
27. Id. (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963); United
States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 730-35 (1975)) (citations omitted).
28. UNEs, or "unbundled network elements," refers to individual inputs, services, or
facilities that the incumbent carrier is required to share with rivals under the 1996 Tele-
communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (3) (2000).
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The FCC's § 271 authorization order for Verizon to provide long-
distance service in New York discussed at great length Verizon's
commitments to provide access to UNEs, including the provision
of OSS. Those commitments are enforceable by the FCC through
continuing oversight; a failure to meet an authorization condition
can result in an order that the deficiency be corrected, in the im-
position of penalties, or in the suspension or revocation of long-
distance approval. Verizon also subjected itself to oversight by the
PSC under a so-called "Performance Assurance Plan" (PAP). The
PAP, which by its terms became binding upon FCC approval, pro-
vides specific financial penalties in the event of Verizon's failure to
achieve detailed performance requirements. The FCC described
Verizon's having entered into a PAP as a significant factor in its
§ 271 authorization, because that provided "a strong financial in-
centive for post-entry compliance with the section 271 checklist,"
and prevented "backsliding. "29
In addition, the agencies' own record of disciplinary action in this
particular case confirmed that they were performing their job as
contemplated:
The regulatory response to the OSS failure complained of in re-
spondent's suit provides a vivid example of how the regulatory re-
gime operates. When several competitive LECs complained about
deficiencies in Verizon's servicing of orders, the FCC and PSC re-
sponded. The FCC soon concluded that Verizon was in breach of
its sharing duties under § 251(c), imposed a substantial fine, and
set up sophisticated measurements to gauge remediation, with
weekly reporting requirements and specific penalties for failure.
The PSC found Verizon in violation of the PAP even earlier, and
imposed additional financial penalties and measurements with
daily reporting requirements. In short, the regime was an effective stew-
ard of the antitrust function.30
This analysis is equally appropriate to the pharmaceutical indus-
try, although the outcome differs. First of all, most of the antitrust
challenges in the pharmaceutical industry are to such things as im-
proper use of patents or anticompetitive settlements or other license
agreements. Antitrust analysis of such claims is typically more manage-
able than the analysis of claims of unilateral refusal to deal as in the
Trinko case. For example, the conduct at issue in the generic drug
patent infringement suits, where settlement agreements have involved
"exit payments", 3 1 is simple collusion or market division. Such agree-
29. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. at 882 (quoting In re Application by Bell Atlantic New York for
Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act To Provide In-Region, In-
terLATA Service in the State of New York, 15 F.C.C.R. 3953, 3958-59, 8, 12 (1999)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order)) (citations omitted).
30. Id. (second emphasis added).
31. See discussion infra Part III.
[Vol. 39
ments lie much closer to the heart of antitrust's traditional expertise,
their anticompetitive effects are much more widely appreciated, and
antitrust is in a position to fashion more effective remedies. The prob-
lem of antitrust challenges to patent infringement suits is more com-
plicated. Nevertheless, antitrust has developed some fairly clear rules
for dealing with such claims. 32
On the other side, while pharmaceuticals in general and generic
entry in particular are heavily regulated, the regulatory regime rarely
operates as an "effective steward of the antitrust function," as Trinko
put it.33 For example, while the Hatch-Waxman Act 34 establishes rules
for facilitating the entry of generic competition into the pharmaceuti-
cal market, settlement agreements between pioneers and generics,
under which a generic stays out of the market in exchange for a large
payment, are largely private affairs. They are not required to be sub-
mitted to any agency for approval under a process that evaluates them
for their impact on competition. Likewise, while "Orange Book" list-
ing of New Drug Applications must be filed with the FDA, that agency
assiduously avoids passing judgment on the merits of such filings.35
This is a far cry from the situation in the Trinko case, where the regula-
tory agencies actively intervened to ensure that the competitive carri-
ers were given ample opportunity to enter markets for local telephone
service.
In sum, two factors-somewhat simpler antitrust rules to be ap-
plied and little or no antitrust-like scrutiny of private business prac-
tices-means that antitrust should not be reluctant to intervene
against practices in the pharmaceutical industry when a true injury to
competition is apparent.
M. The Antitrust Rules of Decision
It is commonly said that antitrust analysis proceeds under two dif-
ferent rules. The per se rule is reserved for a small subset of offenses
that have been found to be clearly anticompetitive on a number of
occasions. Courts sometimes say that after there is sufficient judicial
experience with a type of restraint so that the court may conclude that
32. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, 706.
33. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. at 882.
34. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)).
35. See aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230-32 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
538 U.S. 923 (2003); Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 900-02 (7th
Cir. 2004); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 276 F.3d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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it is virtually always anticompetitive, from that point on the restraint
can be condemned simply upon proof that it has occurred, without
elaborate inquiry into the defendant's market power, the actual an-
ticompetitive effects of the restraint in a particular case, or the ratio-
nales offered for it.36 In antitrust we call this the per se rule. Today,
naked horizontal agreements such as price fixing and market division,
as well as resale price maintenance and most tying arrangements, are
governed by per se rules.37
By contrast, the "rule of reason" is reserved for types of practices
that are facially ambiguous.38 Most practices challenged under the an-
titrust laws fall into this category. The practice might be anticompeti-
tive under some circumstances but not others. Or the practice might
have some offsetting benefits, and be seriously threatening only if the
defendant or defendants have significant market power, which must
then be determined. Or a practice, while prima facie anticompetitive,
may have perfectly innocent or procompetitive explanations that can
be raised as defenses.
Hornbook antitrust law has traditionally placed these two modes
of antitrust analysis into fairly well-defined and mutually exclusive
pigeonholes. In the past two decades, however, the courts have begun
to see that the world of antitrust practices is both more complex and
more ambiguous. Practices come in an infinite variety and their
threats as well as their promises depend on the circumstances. To be
sure, at the margins there are still plenty of well-defined practices. At
one end, naked price fixing-that is, competitor agreement on prices
that is not accompanied by any integration of production or distribu-
tion-is and should be unlawful per se, without an inquiry into power
36. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n ("NCAA") v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984)
('Judicial experience" determines when per se rule should be applied); see also FFC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) ("Once experience with a
particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of
reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unrea-
sonable"); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 2 (1979) ('It is only
after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them
as per se violations of the Sherman Act." (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 486-87
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Per se rules of antitrust illegality are reserved for those situations where logic and
experience show that the risk of injury to competition ... is so pronounced that it
is needless and wasteful to conduct the usual judicial inquiry into the balance
between the behavior's procompetitive benefits and its anticompetitive costs.
Id.
37. See 11 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, 2005, supra note 1, 1909.
38. See, e.g., California Dental Ass'n v. FfC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999).
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or effects. At the other pole, purely unilateral practices must generally
be subjected to a full rule of reason analysis because unilateral prac-
tices are much more difficult for courts to characterize, and for a firm
to attain power unilaterally is much more difficult than for a group of
firms to attain it by agreement.39
In the middle are a fair range of practices that are not susceptible
to per se illegality, but should not be subjected to a full rule of reason
analysis either. These practices are competitively dangerous, perhaps
highly so, but they may have socially beneficial explanations, and the
defendant should be given an opportunity to give them. In such cases,
the best rule is to use a set of shifting presumptions, with the burden
of proof at each stage given to the person whose claim is least plausi-
ble. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving a highly dangerous sounding
restraint in a market prone to monopoly power, then the defendant
should be made to prove that the restraint is in fact efficient or at least
benign. By contrast, if the plaintiff s proof of a restraint is fairly weak,
then it should remain the plaintiffs burden to show that a proffered
defense really does not apply.
In a world where information is highly imperfect such a set of
default rules often determines the outcome. That is, when informa-
tion fails on a certain issue, the loser is the person who has the burden
of proof on that issue. Assigning default rules in this fashion mini-
mizes errors by placing the cost of information failure on the person
with the least plausible claim.
A good illustration of the incorrect application of such default
rules is the Supreme Court's decision in California Dental Association v.
FTC (CDA) 40 in 1999, where a 5-4 Court approved a professional asso-
ciation's restraints on dentist advertising characterized as "mislead-
ing," but that effectively prohibited virtually all forms of quality and
price advertising.41 The plaintiff, the Federal Trade Commission,
proved a horizontal restraint of a kind that has always been recog-
nized by the courts as highly suspicious-namely, prohibitions on ad-
vertising of quality and price.42 Further, the Court conceded that this
was a market that did not function very well. 43 1 Dentists had a consider-
39. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2005).
40. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
41. Id.
42. See 12 HOVENKAmP, AN-TRUST LAw, 2005, supra note 1, 1 2023.
43. California Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 770-74 (citingJack L. Carr & Frank Mathewson,
The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & EcoN. 307,
309 (1990); George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty and the Market
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able advantage over their patients because the dentist knew best what
the patient needed, communication about defective dentistry was
poor, and patients often had to make decisions about specific proce-
dures after they were seated in a dentist's chair, thus making the cost
of comparative shopping very high.44
These market factors made the restraint at issue highly suspicious
because they indicated a market that was excessively prone to collu-
sion. This should have placed the burden on the defendants of show-
ing that the restraints would in fact be beneficial to competition
because they did no more than condemn false or misleading claims.
Unfortunately, the Court drew precisely the opposite inference from
the market imperfections that it described. It believed that these im-
perfections made consumers more vulnerable to false claims and that
the dentists themselves were worthy policemen to protect them. As a
result it held that the FTC was required to show that the restraints had
an anticompetitive impact, something that is virtually impossible to do
in many cases. Having shown a highly suspicious horizontal restraint
in a market where sellers controlled all the important information,
the burden should have shifted to the defendant to show that the re-
straints were procompetitive because they had by far the less plausible
claim.
Patent settlement agreements that involve exit or non-entry pay-
ments should be subject to a similar analysis. While the facts of these
cases differ considerably, many of them share a common kernel that
exhibits the following pattern. The pioneer patentee of a drug files a
patent infringement suit against a rival firm who has or is about to
make a generic version of the drug. The rival may or may not have
obtained requisite approval from the FDA. The two parties then settle
their patent dispute. Under the settlement the generic firm who is the
infringement defendant agrees not to enter the market for the drug
in question, or else agrees to exit from the market if it has already
begun entry, and agrees not to challenge the pioneer's patent. In ex-
change, the patentee/infringement plaintiff agrees to pay a signifi-
cant sum of money to the infringement defendant. The result is that
for a certain period of years this particular generic producer is dis-
abled by the settlement agreement from entering the market. Under
the Hatch-Waxman Act, which gives first comers to the generic market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490-91 (1970) (pointing out quality problems in market
characterized by asymmetrical information)).
44. California Dental Ass'n., 526 U.S. at 772.
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a temporary exclusive right, the effect of the agreement may also be to
keep other generics from entering as well.
45
Agreements settling patent disputes are as old as the patent laws
themselves and there are good reasons for courts to encourage good
faith settlements. Litigated outcomes in patent cases tend to be diffi-
cult to predict, with many patents held invalid. 46 On the other side,
often the consequence of settlement is no worse than the conse-
quence of a litigated outcome. For example, probably the most com-
mon outcome of settlement in patent infringement litigation is some
type of agreement in which the infringement defendant pays a fee to
the infringement plaintiff for a license coupled with some restrictions
on the production or sale of the patented article.47 Leaving aside the
question of patent validity, such an outcome is competitively prefera-
ble to an outcome under which the patent is declared valid and the
infringement defendant is excluded from the market altogether. Of
course, the outcome may not be as competitive as one where the pat-
ent is declared invalid and the infringement defendant plus anyone
else who wants to may now enter competition with the patentee.
For these reasons antitrust courts have been somewhat deferen-
tial to settlement agreements, and many have been approved even
though certain arrangements contained in the settlements would con-
stitute per se violations if the agreements were not part of the settle-
ment.48 Perhaps the most famous of these is the GE rule, named after
a 1926 decision upholding a settlement agreement under which the
infringement plaintiff (GE) licensed the technology to the infringe-
ment defendant (Westinghouse) and also fixed the price at which
Westinghouse was to sell goods manufactured under the license. 49
45. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 3, § 7.4(e); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Balancing Ease and Accuracy in Assessing Pharmaceutical
Exclusion Payments, 88 MINN. L. REv. 712, 717 & n.23 (2004).
46. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1613-14; John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 224-25 (1998).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), affd
by divided court, 382 U.S. 197 (1965) (settlement included cross-licensing with price restric-
tions); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952) (similar); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, clarified by 324 U.S. 570 (1945) (settlement included
horizontal customer restrictions); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277
(1942) (cross-licensing; price restrictions); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283
U.S. 163 (1931) (patent pool).
48. For a detailed survey of the case law, see HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note
3, at ch. 7.
49. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926). See HOVENKAMP, JANIS &
LEMLEY, supra note 3, §§ 31.1-31.2; 12 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, 2005, supra note 1,
2041.
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Exit or non-entry payment cases are a novelty in antitrust. They
became popular after the Hatch-Waxman Act took effect because of
the unique effect that the statute has had on generic entry. The stat-
ute effectively gives a single firm the right to be the first generic en-
trant into a market when the relevant pioneer patent expires and also
permits that generic firm's production decisions to determine when
second, third, and subsequent generic producers can enter.50 As a re-
sult an exit payment settlement can effectively prolong the life of the
pioneer's patent by ensuring that no firm enters that market for some
time. 51
Recent congressional amendments have served to reduce the
value of such agreements. They provide that the first generic to file its
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"), which contemplates
FDA approval to market a new generic (provided that the product
does not infringe any still valid patent) is entitled to only 180 days of
generic exclusivity. Further, the exclusivity will be forfeited if the ge-
neric producer fails to enter the market within a reasonable time.52
That provision reduces the value of anticompetitive settlements be-
cause they will be less likely to deter entry indefinitely. Nevertheless,
the gains from an anticompetitive settlement agreement-and corre-
sponding consumer losses-could still be significant.5 3
Applying the antitrust laws to such an agreement need not be so
difficult. First, a "naked" exit payment agreement in which one com-
petitor paid a rival to stay out of its market would be a per se unlawful
conspiracy under Section I of the Sherman Act. Second, courts will
grant some deference to such agreements if they appear to be part of
a bona fide settlement of an intellectual property dispute. So, the
agreements are not automatically illegal, but they are not automati-
cally legal either. Thus, from that point, the analysis must mainly con-
sist of looking for other danger signals, the most important of which
50. See, e.g., Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 276 F.3d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1063-65 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
51. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 3, § 7.4(e). The statute produces this
result by giving the first generic a 180-day exclusivity period which begins to run on (1) the
date on which the first generic begins marketing the generic product or (2) the date of a
court decision holding the patent invalid or not infringed. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(0) (5) (B) (iv)
(2000). A properly crafted settlement may entail that the prospective generic entrant will
never begin marketing the product and that the patent will never be declared invalid or
not infringed.
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2004) (amendments).
53. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 3, § 7.4(e).
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are: (1) the size of the exit payment and (2) the impact of the exit
payment on third party entry prospects.
The principal relevance of size is that litigation of patent infringe-
ment cases is both costly and rife with uncertainty. Even a patentee
who is one hundred percent certain that its patent will be declared
valid and infringed would be willing to make a payment that is lower
than anticipated litigation costs. For that reason, relatively small pay-
ments or other compensation in exchange for the infringement de-
fendant's promise to stay out of a market should be regarded as fairly
benign. These are merely nuisance payments or a bit of insurance
against an unanticipated declaration of invalidity. But as the payment
becomes larger, going into several millions of dollars, then something
else must be going on. Mainly, the infringement plaintiff must have
significant doubts about the validity of its patent or the defendant's
status as an infringer. Thus, a larger payment suggests a more socially
costly outcome-namely, preserving the exclusion power of the pat-
ent, at least vis-a-vis this particular defendant, even though the patent
is likely to be invalid. The result is to deny the public the benefits of
competition that it could otherwise obtain.
The other factor that a court should assess in exit payment cases
is the impact of the agreement on third parties. In a world in which
there are numerous firms willing and able to enter the market, an exit
payment to one particular infringement defendant need not have sig-
nificant anticompetitive effects. If there is good reason for believing
the patent invalid others will try the same thing. Of course, a series of
exit payments to several potential entrants could indicate a wider car-
tel, and there is an ample history of litigation among large numbers of
rivals being settled with a comprehensive licensing agreement.54
The peculiar circumstances of the Hatch-Waxman Act invite the
court to consider the social, or public, impact of an exit payment set-
tlement. The settlement itself may serve to delay entry by second or
third generics. 55 In that case the combination of a high payment plus
54. However, the settlement of the litigation typically did not involve exit payments,
but rather cross-licenses, pools, or agreements fixing prices or dividing markets. See, e.g., E.
Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (price fixing); United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 318-19 (1948) (similar); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940) (similar); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753,
814 (D.N.J. 1949) (output limitation); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp.
648, 683 (D.S.C. 1977), affd in relevant part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1015 (1980) (cross-licensing); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,
clarified by 324 U.S. 570 (1945) (market division).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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an agreement that delays entry, not only by the settlor but also by
other firms, simply poses competitive risks that are too large. For that
reason, the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Cardizem CD Antitrust Litiga-
tion5 6 seems correct if limited to the facts of that case, 57 the Eleventh
Circuit's Valley Drug Co., Inc. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.58 decision
seems wrong,59 and the Federal Trade Commission's approach in In re
Schering-Plough6 ° seems about right.61
In Cardizem the Sixth Circuit applied the per se rule to an exit
payment. However, there was more to the story, and the per se rule
was probably justified on the facts of that case. After the pioneer pat-
entee filed its infringement suit against the generic, the two firms set-
tled under an agreement in which the generic agreed to stay out of
the market in exchange for payments of $40 million per year.62 How-
ever, the settlement agreement also restrained the generic firm "from
marketing other bioequivalent or generic versions of Cardizem CD
which were not at issue in the pending HMRI/Andrx patent case.."
63
Outside the context of a settlement agreement, a naked payment to
another firm to stay out of one's market is per se unlawful. 64 In any
event, the court focused on the principal agreement between the two
firms, concluding:
[T]he Agreement cannot be fairly characterized as merely an at-
tempt to enforce patent rights or an interim settlement of the pat-
ent litigation. As the plaintiffs point out, it is one thing to take
advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but
another thing altogether to bolster the patent's effectiveness in in-
hibiting competitors by paying the only potential competitor $40
million per year to stay out of the market.65
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit required a full rule of reason
analysis in Valley Drug.66 In that case Abbott held the pioneer patent
56. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (petition for certiorari pending).
57. Id.
58. 344 F.3d 1294 (lth Cir. 2003) (petition for certiorari pending).
59. Id.
60. No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003).
61. Id.
62. See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902.
63. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 697 (E.D. Mich. 2000),
affd, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); see also In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908 & n.13.
64. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990); see also United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 274-79 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and affd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899) (cartel members paid each other "bonuses" for right to be winning bidder).
65. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
66. Valley Drug Co., Inc. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003);
see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d 188
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (agreement involving exclusion payments from pioneer drug to keep
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on the drug Hytrin. While its original patent expired, Abbott had ob-
tained additional patents for other forms of the compound, as well as
for methods of preparing it.67 Geneva and Zenith, two generic drug
producers, filed ANDAs, signaling their intent to enter different por-
tions of the market. Geneva and Zenith then sought to have Abbott's
later patents delisted.68 When Abbott filed an infringement claim the
two firms settled with Abbott. Under the settlement agreement they
acknowledged the validity of Abbott's patents and Zenith received a
promise of $24 million per year until a different generic manufacturer
entered the market.69 Abbott also settled with Geneva, promising $4.5
million monthly, 70 and Geneva agreed not to market its generic drug
until an infringement suit on the principal subsequent Abbott patent
had been decided. 71
The Eleventh Circuit accepted the defendant's argument that the
per se rule is a function of judicial experience and that courts lacked
sufficient experience with this type of agreement to apply the per se
rule. However, antitrust rules of decision are not market specific. They
apply to classes of agreements. Naked horizontal restraints have been
unlawful per se for decades, 72 including some naked restraints con-
tained in patent settlement agreements. 73
The Eleventh Circuit required a full analysis of market power in
the patented drug. But that seems unnecessary under the facts of a
nearly naked horizontal agreement and a very large exit payment. The
payment, which is a fixed cost, is valuable only to the extent that it
permits the payor to charge prices above marginal cost. To be sure,
measuring market power in pharmaceutical markets is difficult be-
generics of the market should be addressed under the rule of reason where the agreement
itself did not require greater exclusion than the patent itself would have required; agree-
ment in this case did not restrain other generic producers from coming in).
67. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1298.
68. Id. at 1298-99.
69. On March 31, 1998 Abbott and Zenith entered into an agreement under which
Abbott would pay Zenith $3 million up front, $3 million after the first three months, and
$6 million every three months thereafter until March 1, 2000, or until the agreement oth-
erwise terminated. If another generic manufacturer entered the market and obtained a
180-day exclusivity period, Abbott's payments would be cut in half until the termination of
the agreement. Id. at 1300.
70. Id
71. The invalidity of that patent was later established. See Abbott Labs. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir.1999).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 278-79.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
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cause so many of the costs are fixed. A firm that recovered only its
direct production and distribution costs would be losing money. But
the best way to respond to this difficulty is to limit the market power
query and consider only whether the agreement is likely to result in
higher drug prices-or more precisely, drug prices that fail to come
down. Generics also have production and distribution costs, presuma-
bly equal to those of the pioneer.
Thus, a very large payment indicates that the pioneer is earning
profits well above its production costs and that these will be
threatened by generic entry. This establishes short-run power. Of
course, having power is not an antitrust offense, but the willingness to
make such a large payment also indicates significant doubts about the
validity of the patent. The ultimate question was not whether the pio-
neer had the power to charge prices well above cost-clearly it did-
but whether the patent laws entitled it to those prices.
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the existence of the '207
patent "may" have entitled Abbott to a preliminary injunction pend-
ing the appeal, which would also have had the effect of keeping the
rivals out of the market.74 But, the important point seems to be that
rather than obtaining a preliminary injunction Abbott chose to pay
very large sums of money in order to obtain its rivals' agreement not
to enter its markets. A firm willing to pay roughly $75 million per year
to keep an alleged infringer out of the market when a successful pre-
liminary injunction would have done the same thing for the cost of
obtaining the injunction indicates that the prospects for a preliminary
injunction were very poor.
The remaining question was the impact of the settlement agree-
ment on the ability of outsiders to challenge the Abbott patents and
enter the market. If the effect of the settlement was to do no more
than deter two potential entrants and there were several others legally
and practically able to enter the market immediately, then a more
searching inquiry into the rationale for such large payments would be
appropriate. However, if the impact of these large payments was to
make the extended patents free from challenge by anyone, then the
risk of competitive harm is simply too great.
One of the problems that has sharply distinguished Hatch-Wax-
man settlement payments from other types of settlements is that
under them the only parties legally in a position to challenge a patent
become the participants in a cartel-like agreement perpetuating the
74. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1305-06.
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patent and high drug prices. This is always an important point. As a
general proposition, patent settlement agreements bind only the par-
ties to the agreement; they do not serve to extend patent rights as
against the world. For example, suppose Westinghouse disputes GE's
light bulb patent and the two settle by a license agreement in which
Westinghouse is authorized to make bulbs and must charge a certain
price for them. While that agreement sounds anticompetitive, it nev-
ertheless binds only GE and Westinghouse. If GE's patent really seems
dubious other firms can also challenge it. The "first in line" require-
ments of the Hatch-Waxman Act change all that, however, by permit-
ting a settlement agreement by the first generic to hold up entry by
others.
75
In explaining its decision to apply the rule of reason, the court
reasoned:
It may be that the size of the payment to refrain from competing,
sometimes called a "reverse payment" or an "exit payment," raises
the suspicion that the parties lacked faith in the validity of the pat-
ent, particularly when those payments are non-refundable in the
event that the patentee prevails on the infringement claim (as a
bond posted as part of a preliminary injunction would be). How-
ever, in the instant case and given the state of the current record, it
is difficult to infer from the size of the payments alone that the
infringement suits lacked merit. We do not know, for example,
what lost profits Abbott expected from generic competition or
what profits Geneva and Zenith expected to gain from entry, the
risk of the defendants' inability to satisfy a judgment, or the litiga-
tion costs each side expected to save from settlement. We do not
know how much of the payment might have been in exchange for
provisions of the Agreements other than Zenith's and Geneva's ac-
knowledgment of validity. Without these facts we cannot confi-
dently draw the conclusion, merely from the size of the payments,
that there were no genuine disputes over the validity of the
patent. 76
The court is correct that on a limited record a great deal of un-
certainty exists about many possibilities, particularly if they have not
yet occurred. But asking the fact-finder to determine the size of antici-
pated future profits, the risk of the defendants' inability to satisfy a
judgment, or anticipated litigation costs are monumental burdens,
and under the rule of reason all of them lay with the defendant. Pay-
ments of the size in question in Valley Drug indicate extremely strong
doubts about the validity of the patent. When coupled with the fact
that Abbott had the right to pursue a preliminary injunction but
75. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (5) (B) (iv) (2000).
76. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1310.
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chose not to do so, the inference is strong that no one really expected
that this patent would be upheld in litigation, and eventually it was
found invalid. 77 That was enough information to identify a "highly
suspicious" restraint and switch the burden of proof to the defendant
to show that its payment was reasonable under the circumstances. 78
The Federal Trade Commission was much more sensitive to the
administrative difficulties and anticompetitive threats presented by
such cases. In Schering-Plough it began with the premise that exit pay-
ments raise a "red flag" that merits deeper inquiry.79 It observed:
The appropriate antitrust analysis extends over a continuum, rang-
ing from per se condemnation of particularly egregious conduct to
a detailed examination of more ambiguous behavior, responsive to
the facts of individual cases. Here, we will need to undertake a
more detailed examination of market effects than was required ei-
ther in California Dental80 or in PolyGram Holding, 81 but the
guiding principles are the same. We review the agreements in this
case under the rule-of-reason standard, but apply a different meth-
odology from that set out in the Initial Decision. We conclude that
the Initial Decision's approach-which defines a relevant market,
calculates shares, and then draws inferences from these shares and
from other industry characteristics-is not the most appropriate
way to proceed in cases like this one where more direct evidence of
competitive effects is available.
Once Complaint Counsel have demonstrated anticompetitive ef-
fects under the standard we apply, Respondents must demonstrate
that the challenged provisions are justified by procompetitive bene-
fits that are both cognizable and plausible.8 2
The FTC noted that Schering anticipated the loss of huge sales as
a consequence of generic entry,83 and cited studies showing drastic
declines in drug prices once a generic entered the market in competi-
tion with a pioneer.84 Indeed, the sheer magnitude of the payments in
77. See supra text notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
78. The court also noted that the agreement in question included a clause "prohibit-
ing [the entrants from] marketing 'any' generic terazosin product." Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at
1311-12; see also In reTerozosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (opinion of the district court). As noted previously, an agreement requir-
ing a rival not to produce a product that is not covered by the patent is unlawful per se.
79. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)
(Opinion of the Commission Part II.B.4).
80. California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
81. In re PolyGram Holding, Inc., No. 9298, 2003 WiL 21770765 (F.T.C.July 24, 2003).
82. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)
(Opinion of the Commission Part I.C).
83. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651 (Opinion of the Commis-
sion Part II.B.2).
84. Id. (citing Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Price of
Pharmaceuticals, 6J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 89 (1997) ("The substantial shift in mar-
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this case was a major source of competitive concern. Nonetheless, the
FTC refused to make reverse payments per se unlawful across the
board. In this case, the evidence made out a prima facie case of an-
ticompetitive effects. It was then up to the respondent to come for-
ward with a procompetitive justification for the payment, and the
general claim that patent settlements are good things was
insufficient.8 5
Conclusion
Antitrust policy at the margin always involves making estimates in
the face of uncertainty. When cases are clear, antitrust can proceed
with confidence, but, when they are not, it must proceed cautiously
and defer to the market itself unless it is reasonably sure.
But none of this means that antitrust policy should stubbornly
insist on strict and exhaustive proof of marginally ambiguous prac-
tices. Rather, it means that those interpreting the antitrust laws make
reasonable decisions under limited information. A rational actor does
not collect every bit of information about a problem before making a
decision. Particularly in cases where information is costly, she collects
enough information to be reasonably sure. Even a rational actor also
draws presumptions in favor of that which is most likely and requires
hard evidence to defeat that presumption. Only when it follows this
course can antitrust reduce its administrative costs and improve its re-
sults to the point that it becomes an effective tool of economic policy.
ket share from brand-name to generic producers (40%-50%) along with the significantly
reduced price of generic substitutes (25%-30% lower) means that the average price of a
prescription for a compound subject to generic competition has fallen."); Henry G. Gra-
bowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals After
the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331, 335 (1992) (the "general pattern is that generics
enter at a significant discount to the pioneering product [and] . . .the prices of the pio-
neering brands remain higher than their generic competitors and actually increase in
nominal terms" and "[a]verage market price [weighted by sales of the brand and generic]
declined by a little more than 10 percent per year in the first two years after generic
entry").
85. See id. (Opinion of the Commission Part III). The Commission stated:
We conclude that Respondents' ancillarity defense has failed. A payment in the
order of $60 million could not be defended under these facts as a reasonably
necessary element of a settlement that is procompetitive overall. The parties did
not show that the hypothetical situations where such a payment might be justified
actually were present in this case. The ancillarity claim is rather based on after-
the-fact rationalization.
Id.; see also In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
that the justifications offered for large reverse payment settlements are unpersuasive).
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